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Abstract
This paper provides a model that allows for a criterion of admissibility based
on a subjective state space. For this purpose, we build a non-Archimedean
model of preference with subjective states, generalizing Blume, Brandenburger,
and Dekel [2], who present a non-Archimedean model with exogenous states;
and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [4], who present an Archimedean model
with an endogenous state space. We interpret the representation as modeling
an agent who has several \hypotheses" about her state space, and who views
some as \in¯nitely less relevant" than others.
JEL classi¯cation: D81
Keywords: admissibility, subjective state space, non-Archimedean preferences,
lexicographic expected utility.
1 Introduction
Admissibility has been widely used as a criterion of rationality in decision and game
theory.1 It is the requirement that \weakly dominated" actions should not be taken.
That is, one action should be preferred to another if the outcome of the ¯rst action
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Noor, John Quiggin, and Norio Takeoka. We acknowledge helpful feedback from audiences of the
2006 JEA Spring Meeting, RUD 2006, SWET 2007, Hitotsubashi, Kyoto, and Toyama Universities.
Hyogo gratefully acknowledges the ¯nancial support by KAKENHI (19830099).
yHigashi is at the Faculty of Economics, Hosei University, 4342 Aihara-cho, Machida, Tokyo
194-0298, Japan, yhigashi@hosei.ac.jp; Hyogo is at the Faculty of Economics, Ryukoku University,
67 Fukakusa Tsukamoto-cho, Fushimi-ku, Kyoto 612-8577, Japan, hyogo@econ.ryukoku.ac.jp.
1See for example, Arrow [1], Luce and Rai®a [11], Kohlberg and Mertens [8], and Brandenberger,
Friedenberg, and Keisler [3].
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is at least as good as that of the second action for each state, and strictly better for
at least one state.
For the criterion of admissibility, it is crucial for the modeler to identify what
uncertainties the agent perceives in her mind. However, the state space in the agent's
mind is not directly observable to the modeler. The aim of this paper is to build
a model that allows for the criterion of admissibility based on the subjective state
space.
In the theory of subjective probability, Savage derives unique probability over
objective states from preference and provides an axiomatic foundation for subjective
expected utility theory. Subjective expected utility models satisfy admissibility only if
there is no null state. This assumption is restrictive because such preferences would
rule out pure strategy equilibria in games.2 In an Anscombe{Aumann framework,
Blume, Brandenburger, and Dekel [2] (henceforth, BBD) develop a non-Archimedean
subjective probability model that allows for both the criterion of admissibility and
\null" events, although not in the sense of Savage. In their model, the agent has
a lexicographic hierarchy of subjective probabilities over objective states and may
think that some states are \in¯nitely less relevant" than others. Unless two actions
are indi®erent in terms of all states in the ¯rst hierarchy, the agent does not care
about outcomes in the other states. The agent thinks \null" states as in¯nitely less
relevant, but does not entirely exclude them from consideration.
A restrictive feature of BBD is the exogenous state space. Kreps [9, 10] shows
how the ranking of menus of alternatives reveals subjective uncertainty. Building
on that, Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [4] (henceforth, DLR) endogenize the state
space in an Archimedean framework. DLR take preference over menus of lotteries as a
primitive and derive a unique subjective state space, corresponding to possible future
preferences over lotteries. In this paper, we provide a non-Archimedean model with
subjective states, which in principle enables us to use admissibility criterion based on
the subjective state space. Our model is related to BBD in the same way that DLR
is related to Savage.
As in DLR, this paper considers preference over menus of lotteries. By weakening
their axiom Continuity, we provide a lexicographic representation (S; U; f¹kgKk=1): is a
tuple consisting of a nonempty ¯nite state space S, a state dependent utility function
U : ¢(B)£S ! R, and a hierarchy f¹kgKk=1 of (signed) measures such that for every
menu x and y
x % y ,
ÃX
s2Sk
¹k(s)max
¯2x
U(¯; s)
!K
k=1
¸L
ÃX
s2Sk
¹k(s)max
¯2y
U(¯; s)
!K
k=1
;
here ¢(B) is the set of lotteries over a ¯nite set of prizes B, and ¸L compares
each level of the hierarchy lexicographically. In the special case of our model where
°exibility is valued, all ¹k's are positive measures.
2In complete information games, one can think of states as other agents' pure strategy pro¯les.
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The interpretation of the representation above is as follows. The agent anticipates
that after a state in S will be realized, she chooses the best lottery out of the menu.
The di®erence from DLR is how she perceives subjective contingencies ex ante. That
is, in her mind, the agent has multiple hypotheses about subjective states. The mea-
sure ¹1 indicates her primary hypothesis about subjective states. She has a secondary
hypothesis ¹2. If two menus are indi®erent according to her primary hypothesis, she
uses the secondary hypothesis in order to compare the menus. She has a tertiary
hypothesis, which is represented by ¹3, and so on. Since ¹k matters for the rank-
ing of any two menus only if those menus are indi®erent according to ¹1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; ¹k¡1,
we interpret that the hypothesis ¹k is thought of as \in¯nitely less relevant" than
¹1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; ¹k¡1.
For uniqueness of the representation, the relevant part is the ex post preference %¤s
over ¢(B) determined by each s 2 S. Under suitable conditions, we show uniqueness
of the hierarchy of (incomplete) subjective state spaces f%¤sj s 2 [kj=1supp(¹j)gKk=1.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the DLR model.
In section 3, we provide an example showing that Continuity is not always compelling.
Section 4 states the main results. All proofs are collected in the appendix.
2 The DLR Model
DLR include the following primitives:
² B: ¯nite set of prizes, let jBj = B
² ¢(B): set of probability measures over B, it is compact metric under the weak
convergence topology; a generic element is denoted by ¯ and referred to as a
lottery
² X : set of closed nonempty subsets of ¢(B), it is endowed with the Hausdor®
topology; a generic element is denoted by x and called a menu3
² preference % is de¯ned on X
The interpretation is as follows: At time 0 (ex ante), the agent chooses a menu
according to %. At time 1 (ex post), a subjective state is realized and then she
chooses a lottery out of the previously chosen menu. Note that the ex post stage is
not a primitive of the formal model. However, since the agent is forward looking,
her ex ante choice of menus re°ects her subjective perception of states. Therefore,
preference % over menus reveals a subjective state space.
The following are the main axioms in DLR.
3DLR do not restrict menus to be closed. If we allow any subset to be a menu, then we have to
modify the de¯nition of critical set. Under slight modi¯cation, all results remain the same.
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Axiom 1 (Order). % is complete and transitive.
We de¯ne the mixture of two menus for a number ¸ 2 [0; 1] by
¸x+ (1¡ ¸)x0 = ©¸¯ + (1¡ ¸)¯0j¯ 2 x; ¯0 2 x0ª:
The following is a version of the Independence Axiom adapted to a model with
preference over menus.
Axiom 2 (Independence). For all x; y; z 2 X and ¸ 2 (0; 1),
x % y , ¸x+ (1¡ ¸)z % ¸y + (1¡ ¸)z:
Axiom 3 (Nontriviality). There exist x and x0 such that x Â x0.
Axiom 4 (Continuity). For every menu x, the sets fx0 2 X jx0 % xg and
fx0 2 X jx % x0g are closed.
The next axiom is introduced by Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [5] (henceforth,
DLR2) to ensure, together with the other axioms, the ¯niteness of the state space.
Let conv(x) denote the convex hull of x.
De¯nition 1. A set x0 ½ conv(x) is critical for x if for all menus y with x0 ½
conv(y) ½ conv(x), we have y » x.
Axiom 5 (Finiteness). Every menu has a ¯nite critical subset.
The intuition is that when the agent faces a menu and contemplates future contin-
gencies, she cares about only ¯nite possibilities. Note that the set of states she cares
about could depend on the menu. Therefore, this axiom does not imply ¯niteness of
the subjective state space by itself.
Now, we explain a ¯nite state space version of DLR's model. Let S be a state
space. A function U : ¢(B) £ S ! R is a state dependent utility function if U(¯; s)
has an expected utility form, that is, for ¯ 2 ¢(B),
U(¯; s) =
X
b2B
¯(b)U(b; s):
Consider the functional form W : X ! R de¯ned by
W (x) =
X
s2S
¹(s)max
¯2x
U(¯; s); (1)
where ¹ is a measure on S.
Note that S is just an index set though we call it the state space. Given the pair
(S; U), de¯ne the ex post preference %¤s over ¢(B) by
¯ %¤s ¯0 , U(¯; s) ¸ U(¯0; s);
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and let
P (S; U) = f%¤s js 2 Sg:
Following DLR, we refer to the set of ex post preferences P (S; U) as the subjective
state space.
In general, there are many functional forms (1) that represent the same preference
on X . In order to obtain the uniqueness property, DLR concentrate on \relevant"
subjective states: given a representation of the form (1), a state s is relevant if there
exist menus x and y such that x  y and that for every s0 6= s, max¯2x U(¯; s0) =
max¯2y U(¯; s0).
De¯nition 2. A ¯nite additive representation (S; U; ¹) is a tuple consisting of a
nonempty ¯nite state space S, a state dependent utility function U : ¢(B)£S ! R,
and a measure ¹ such that (i) % is represented by the functional form W : X ! R,
(ii) every state s 2 S is relevant, and (iii) if s 6= s0, then %¤s 6=%¤s0 .
DLR and DLR2 prove
Theorem 2.1. % satis¯es Order, Independence, Nontriviality, Continuity, and Finite-
ness if and only if it has a ¯nite additive representation.
Corollary 2.2. Suppose % has a ¯nite additive representation. Then all ¯nite addi-
tive representations of % have the same subjective state space.
Axiom 6 (Monotonicity). If x ½ x0, then x0 % x.
Monotonicity states that the agent values the °exibility of having more options.
The consequence of Monotonicity is the following.
Corollary 2.3. % satis¯es Monotonicity and the axioms in Theorem 2.1 if and only
if it has a ¯nite additive representation with a positive measure ¹.
3 Continuity and a hierarchy of hypothesis
In this section, we argue that the axiom Continuity is not always compelling.
The intuition against Continuity is as follows: Suppose that a menu x is strictly
preferred to a menu x0. Consider an agent who perceives some subjective contingencies
and who has, in her mind, several hypotheses about these contingencies. Think of
a hypothesis as a (singed) measure over contingencies that is used to weight the
valuation of outcomes across states.4 She may view one hypothesis as \in¯nitely less
relevant" than another. Think of this as being captured by a hierarchy of hypotheses.
Then there is a critical level k¤ such that x and x0 are indi®erent according to each
4As explained later, a hypothesis in the formal model does not correspond to beliefs about states,
and thus, we refer instead to \weights."
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hypothesis at level k less than k¤, but x is strictly better than x0 according to the
hypothesis at level k¤. Now consider a \small" variation of x, denoted by x². Then
she should rank x² strictly better than x
0 using only the contingencies derived by the
hypothesis at level k¤. However, the critical level for comparing x0 and x² may be
di®erent than k¤; x0 could be better than x² according to the hypothesis at the new
critical level. Therefore, the small deviation might change the ranking between the
menus.
The following examples are provided to illustrate this intuition.
Example: Consider an agent who used to like peanut butter very much, but who
now has an allergy to peanut. Moreover, when she chooses an orange, she will pick
the one that is more likely to be sweet.
There are three alternatives: the ¯rst one is an orange o² which turns out to be
sweet with probability 0:9 + ² and sour with 0:1 ¡ ²; the second one is an orange o
which turns out to be sweet with probability 0:9 and sour with 0:1; the last one is
bread with peanut butter, which is denoted by p.
She may then have the following ranking: for every ² 2 (0; 0:1]
fo²g Â fo; pg Â fog: (2)
The intuition is that she has two hypotheses for her allergy: the ¯rst is that the
allergy continues, and the second is that the allergy disappears. However, she thinks
that it is in¯nitely less relevant to take into account the possibility that her allergy
disappears. That is, she would rank the two hypotheses hierarchically in her mind.
First, consider the ¯rst and second menus. Since °exibility provided by bread
with peanut butter is irrelevant in the primary hypothesis, the ranking of the ¯rst
and second menus follows the taste of orange. Hence, the agent prefers the ¯rst menu
to the second one.
Next, consider the second and third menus. At ¯rst, the agent uses the primary
hypothesis to rank the menus. Since the two menus are indi®erent in the primary
hypothesis, the ranking of menus in the secondary hypothesis is relevant for her choice
among menus. Thus, she wants to retain the opportunity to have peanut butter. The
agent prefers the second menu to the third one.
Ranking (2) violates Continuity.
4 Lexicographic Representation
In the previous section, the di±culties for Continuity arise out of the strict preference
relation. Therefore, we impose \continuity" only for indi®erence sets.
Axiom 7 (Indi®erence Continuity). For every menu x, the indi®erence set
fx0 2 X jx0 » xg is closed.
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There is no corresponding axiom in BBD. The reason is that BBD assume that
the state space is exogenous and ¯nite. In our model, the state space is derived
endogenously from preference.
Since we weaken Continuity, a numerical representation is not always possible. We
consider a lexicographic representation that compares a vector of utilities assigned to
a menu by ¸L.5 More formally, let S and U : ¢(B) £ S ! R be a state space and
a state dependent utility function. Consider the vector-valued function V : X ! RK
de¯ned by
V (x) =
ÃX
s2S
¹k(s)max
¯2x
U(¯; s)
!K
k=1
; (3)
where f¹kgKk=1 is a hierarchy of measures. This vector-valued function is the coun-
terpart of the DLR functional form (1). We also need a counterpart of \relevance":
given a representation of the form (3), a state s is relevant if there exist menus x and
y such that x  y and that for every s0 6= s, max¯2x U(¯; s0) = max¯2y U(¯; s0).
De¯nition 3. A lexicographic representation
¡
S; U; f¹kgKk=1
¢
is a tuple consisting of a
nonempty ¯nite state space S, a state dependent utility function U : ¢(B)£S ! R,
and a hierarchy f¹kgKk=1 of measures such that
(i) x % y ,
ÃX
s2S
¹k(s)max
¯2x
U(¯; s)
!K
k=1
¸L
ÃX
s2S
¹k(s)max
¯2y
U(¯; s)
!K
k=1
;
(ii) every state s 2 S is relevant, and (iii) if s 6= s0, then %¤s 6=%¤s0 .
The integer K is referred to as the length (of the hierarchy).
Now we state our main result:
Theorem 4.1. % satis¯es Order, Independence, Nontriviality, Indi®erence Continu-
ity, and Finiteness if and only if it has a lexicographic representation.
For interpretation, note that the ex post behavior is as in DLR: a state s in S will
be realized at the beginning of time 1. Then she will choose the best alternative out of
the previously chosen menu according to the ex post utility function U(¢; s). Moreover,
she anticipates this ex post behavior at time 0. The di®erence from DLR is how she
perceives subjective contingencies ex ante. The agent has a hierarchy of measures in
her mind. Each level of the hierarchy represents her hypothesis about how she should
allow for the future contingencies ex ante. The measure ¹1 indicates her primary
hypothesis. She has a secondary hypothesis, which is represented by ¹2. If menus are
indi®erent according to her primary hypothesis, she compares them according to her
secondary hypothesis. She has a tertiary hypothesis, which is represented by ¹3, and
5For a; b 2 RK , a ¸L b if and only if whenever bk > ak, there is a j < k such that aj > bj .
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so on. Since ¹k enters into the ranking of any two menus x and y only if x and y are
indi®erent as to ¹1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; ¹k¡1, the measure ¹k is relevant but may be thought of as
being \in¯nitely less relevant" than ¹1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; ¹k¡1.
To further illustrate the meaning of \¹k is in¯nitely less relevant than ¹k¡1," con-
sider the special case where there is no overlap among the supports of ¹k's. Suppose
that sk¡1 and sk belong to supp(¹k¡1) and supp(¹k) respectively. Consider two menus
x and y such that the agent expects the same ex post utilities at all states except
sk¡1 and sk. Then the ex post ranking between x and y at sk¡1 determines the ex
ante ranking regardless of the ex post ranking at sk. This leads us to say \sk is
in¯nitely less relevant than sk¡1." In the Archimedean case, as in DLR, every state
is either relevant or not. Our model admits a richer comparison between subjective
states. That is, there may be a state which is relevant but in¯nitely less relevant than
another state.
Uniqueness of the representation does not hold in general. For example, the ¹k's
are not uniquely determined by preference, just as in DLR. Secondly, there may be
redundancies in the hierarchy [2, p. 66].
To express the uniqueness properties of our representation, de¯ne for each k =
1; : : : ; K,
Pk(S; U; f¹kgKk=1) = f%¤s js 2 [kj=1supp(¹j)g ½ P (S; U):
Following DLR, we can think of fPk(S; U; f¹kgKk=1)gKk=1 as a hierarchy of (incomplete)
subjective state spaces. Note that there is a lexicographic representation with minimal
lengthK, denoted byK¤. To avoid the redundancies, we concentrate on lexicographic
representations of minimal length K¤.
Corollary 4.2. Suppose that % admits a lexicographic representation. Let
¡
S; U; f¹kgK¤k=1
¢
and
¡
S 0; U 0; f¹0kgK¤k=1
¢
be lexicographic representations of % with the minimal length
K¤. Then, for k = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K¤,
Pk(S; U; f¹kgK¤k=1) = Pk(S 0; U 0; f¹0kgK
¤
k=1):
The next axiom is the di®erence between our model and DLR's ¯nite additive
representation.
Axiom 8 (Upper Semicontinuity). For every menu x, the upper contour set fx0 2
X jx0 % xg is closed.
Theorem 4.3. % has a lexicographic representation and satis¯es Upper Semiconti-
nuity if and only if it has a ¯nite additive representation (as in DLR).
Since the axiom Indi®erence Continuity is uncommon, and perhaps original to this
paper, we next verify that it is critical in Theorem 4.1, that is, it is not implied by
the other axioms. Let u; v : ¢(B) ! R be continuous linear nonconstant functions.
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Consider an order %nsc over menus represented by the following functional form Unsc :
X ! R proposed in Gul and Pesendorfer [6].6
Temptation without self-control :
Unsc(x) = max
¯2x
u(l) subject to v(¯) ¸ v(¯0) for every ¯0 2 x:
It is easy to check that %nsc satis¯es Order, Independence, Nontriviality, and Finite-
ness. However, in general, it violates Indi®erence Continuity: let B = fb1; b2; b3g,
u(¯) = ¯2, and v(¯) = ¯1, where ¯i = ¯(bi). Let ¹¯; ¯
¤; ¯n be lotteries such that
¹¯ = ( ¹¯1; ¹¯2; ¹¯3)
¯¤ = ( ¹¯1; 1¡ ¹¯1; 0)
¯n = ( ¹¯1 ¡ ²n; 1¡ ¹¯1 + ²n; 0) for n ¸ 1;
where ¹¯1; ¹¯2; ¹¯3 > 0 and ¹¯1 > ² > 0. The sequence of menus,
©f ¹¯; ¯ngª1
n=1
, con-
verges to the menu f ¹¯; ¯¤g in the Hausdor® topology and f ¹¯; ¯ng » f ¹¯g for every n.
However, we have f ¹¯; ¯¤g Â f ¹¯g, contradicting Indi®erence Continuity.7
Finally, if we add Monotonicity to the axioms in Theorem 4.1, then all measures
are positive:
Corollary 4.4. % satis¯es Monotonicity and the axioms in Theorem 4.1 if and only
if it has a lexicographic representation where all measures are positive.
Appendix: Proofs
A Proof of Theorem 4.1
The necessity of the axioms is easily veri¯ed. We show only the su±ciency part.
To begin with, note that Finiteness implies that x » conv(x) for every menu
x. In fact, by Finiteness, every menu x has a critical subset x0. Moreover, x0 ½
conv(conv(x)) = conv(x). It follows from the de¯nition of critical set that x »
conv(x). Thus, we can restrict attention to the set of closed, convex, nonempty
subsets of ¢(B), denoted by X ¤.
Let SB = fs 2 RBjPi si = 0; and Pi s2i = 1g. For x 2 X ¤, de¯ne a function
¾x : S
B ! R by
¾x(s) = max
¯2x
¯ ¢ s
The following is Lemma 5 in DLR2 [5]:
6The acronym nsc means no self-control.
7While %nsc may violate Indi®erence Continuity, it satis¯es Upper Semicontinuity (see [6,
p.1413]).
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Lemma 1. There is a ¯nite subset S¤ ½ SB such that
8x; y 2 X ¤; [8s 2 S¤; ¾x(s) = ¾y(s)]) x » y: (4)
Proof. In DLR2's argument, Continuity is required to prove their Lemma 3. In fact,
Indi®erence Continuity is enough to show the result.
If two ¯nite subsets S¤; S¤¤ ½ SB satisfy the condition (4), then so does the
intersection S¤ \ S¤¤. In the following, we identify S¤ as the smallest ¯nite subset of
SB satisfying the condition (4).
Note that S¤ is not empty by Nontriviality. Let m (¸ 1) be the cardinality of S¤.
Appliying the above lemma, we embed X ¤ into m-dimensional vector space. Denote
M = ©(¾x(s))s2S¤ j x 2 X ¤ª ½ Rm:
It is a closed convex subset of Rn and contains the 0 vector. Moreover, it is a mixture
space in the sense of Hausner [7]. In the following, we identify ¾x with a corresponding
element in M.
Preference % on X ¤ induce %¤ on a mixture space M. That is, ¾x %¤ ¾y if and
only if x % y. Since % satis¯es Order and Independence, %¤ also satis¯es Order and
Independence. The following lemma directly follows from the result of Hausner [7].
Lemma 2. (i) %¤ satis¯es Order and Independence if and only if there are K(5 n)
a±ne functions Vk :M! R such that
¾x %¤ ¾y , (Vk(¾x))Kk=1 ¸L (Vk(¾y))Kk=1 :
(ii) Moreover, there is minimal K, denoted by K¤, less than or equal to n. fV 0kgK¤k=1
satisfy the above representation in place of fVkgK¤k=1 if and only if there are real numbers
ak > 0, bkj and ck such that, for every ¾ 2M,
V 0k(¾) = akVk(¾) +
k¡1X
j=1
bkjVj(¾) + ck:
Now, we follow again the argument in DLR2. Then, Vk has a well-de¯ned extension
to a continuous linear function on Rm. Moreover, there exists a vector (¹k(s))s2S¤ 2
Rm such that
Vk(M) =
X
s2S¤
¹k(s)Ms for every M 2M:
De¯ne a state dependent utility function U : ¢(B)£ S¤ ! R by U(¯; s) = ¯ ¢ s: By
construction, every s 2 S¤ is relevant and %¤s 6=%¤s0 if s 6= s0. Thus we have the desired
representation (S¤; U; f¹kgKk=1).
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B Proof of Corollary 4.2
De¯nition 4. A lexicographic representation
¡
¹S; ¹U; f¹kgK¤k=1
¢
is canonical if it satis-
¯es
¹S ½ SB; and ¹U(¯; ¹s) = ¯ ¢ ¹s for every ¯ 2 ¢(B):
Lemma 3. For every
¡
S; U; f¹kgK¤k=1
¢
, there exists a canonical representation
¡
¹S; ¹U; f¹kgK¤k=1
¢
such that (i)
¡
S; U; f¹kgK¤k=1
¢
and
¡
¹S; ¹U; f¹kgK¤k=1
¢
represent the same preference, and
for every k = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K¤,
(ii) Pk(S; U; f¹kgK¤k=1) = Pk( ¹S; ¹U; f¹kgK
¤
k=1):
Proof. Let
cs =
1
B
X
b2B
U(b; s) and ck =
X
s2S
¹k(s)cs:
Note that U(¢; s) cannot be a constant function for every s 2 S since every s 2 S
is relevant. Thus
P
b2B(U(b; s) ¡ cs)2 has to be strictly positive. De¯ne a function
Á : S ! RB by
Á(s) =
µ
U(b; s)¡ csP
b02B(U(b
0; s)¡ cs)2
¶
b2B
:
It is straightforward that Á is one-to-one and Á(s) belongs to SB for every s 2 S.
Let ¹S = Á(S) ½ SB and ¹U(¯; ¹s) = ¯ ¢ ¹s for every ¹s 2 ¹S. De¯ne a measure ¹k over
SM by
¹k(Á(s)) = ¹k(s)
X
b2B
(U(b; s)¡ cs)2:
By de¯nition, %¤s=%¤Á(s) and Á(s) 2 supp(¹) , s 2 supp(¹). Hence, for every
k = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K, Pk(S; U; f¹kgK¤k=1) = Pk( ¹S; ¹U; f¹kgK¤k=1): Moreover, it holds thatX
Á(s)2 ¹S
¹k(Á(s))max
¯2x
¹U(¯; Á(s)) = f
X
s2S
¹k(s)max
¯2x
U(¯; s)g ¡ ck:
Part (ii) of Lemma 2 implies that
¡
S; U; f¹kgK¤k=1
¢
and
¡
¹S; ¹U; f¹kgK¤k=1
¢
represents the
same preference.
Lemma 4. Let
¡
S; U; f¹kgK¤k=1
¢
and
¡
S 0; U 0; f¹0kgK¤k=1
¢
be canonical lexicographic rep-
resentations of % with the minimal length K¤. Then, for k = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K¤,
Pk(S; U; f¹kgK¤k=1) = Pk(S 0; U 0; f¹0kgK
¤
k=1):
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Proof. To begin with, we see that S = S 0 (and hence U = U 0). Suppose to the
contrary that S 6= S 0. Without loss of generality, we assume there exists ¹s 2 S n S 0.
Fix a sphere y ½int¢(B). De¯ne
x = \s2S[S0nf¹sgf¯ 2 ¢(B)j ¯ ¢ s 5 max
¯02y
¯0 ¢ sg:
Since both representations are canonical, it holds that
max
¯2x
U(¯; ¹s) > max
¯2y
U(¯; ¹s);
max
¯2x
U(¯; s) = max
¯2y
U(¯; s) for every s 2 S; s 6= ¹s; and
max
¯2x
U 0(¯; s) = max
¯2y
U 0(¯; s) for every s 2 S 0:
Hence, x  y according to
¡
S; U; f¹kgK¤k=1
¢
, but x » y according to ¡S 0; U 0; f¹0kgK¤k=1¢.
This is a contradiction.
Finally, we show Pk(S
0; U 0; f¹0kgK¤k=1) ½ Pk(S; U; f¹kgK¤k=1). Then the other di-
rection Pk(S; U; f¹kgK¤k=1) ½ Pk(S 0; U 0; f¹0kgK¤k=1) also holds since (S; U; f¹kgK¤k=1) and
(S 0; U 0; f¹0kgK¤k=1) are symmetric. De¯ne, as in the proof of Theorem 4.1,
M = ©(¾x(s))s2S j x 2 X ¤ª ;
Vk(¾x) =
X
s2S
¹k(s)max
¯2x
¯ ¢ s; and
V 0k(¾x) =
X
s2S
¹0k(s)max
¯2x
¯ ¢ s:
Since Vk and V
0
k represents the same order, it follows from Part (ii) of Lemma 2 that
V 0k(¾x) = akVk(¾x) +
k¡1X
j=1
bkjVj(¾x) + ck for k = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K¤:
Thus, supp(¹0k) ½ [kj=1supp(¹j), and hence, for every l 5 k,
supp(¹0l) ½ [lj=1supp(¹j) ½ [kj=1supp(¹j):
Therefore, [kj=1supp(¹0j) ½ [kj=1supp(¹j). That is,
Pk(S
0; U 0; f¹0kgK
¤
k=1) =f%¤s js 2 [kj=1supp(¹0j)g
½f%¤s js 2 [kj=1supp(¹j)g = Pk(S; U; f¹kgK
¤
k=1)
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C Proof of Theorem 4.3
Necessity is straightforward. We show only su±ciency.
Let
¡
S; U; f¹kgK¤k=1
¢
be a canonical lexicographic representation of minimal length
K¤. We see that if K¤ ¸ 2, then Upper Semicontinuity is violated. More speci¯cally,
we construct menus x and x0 and a sequence of menus fxng such that xn ! x, xn Â x0
for every n, and x0 Â x.
Fix a sphere y ½int¢(B). De¯ne
x0 = \s2[2j=1supp(¹j)f¯ 2 ¢(B)j ¯ ¢ s · max¯02y ¯
0 ¢ sg:
Case 1: supp(¹1) ( [2j=1supp(¹j). Pick a state s0 2 supp(¹2) n supp(¹1).
Subcase 1-1: ¹2(s
0) > 0. Let ² > 0. De¯ne
x = \s2[2j=1supp(¹j)f¯ 2 ¢(B)j ¯ ¢ s · f1(s)g;
where f1(s
0) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s0¡ ² and f1(s) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s for s 6= s0. We take ² small
enough so that x is a menu with max¯2x ¯ ¢ s = f1(s) for every s 2 S. This is possible
since S is ¯nite.
Take a state s¤ 2 supp(¹1). First, we consider the case ¹1(s¤) < 0. Let » 2 (0; 1).
De¯ne
xn = \s2[2j=1supp(¹j)f¯ 2 ¢(B)j ¯ ¢ s · g1(s; n)g;
where g1(s
0; n) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s0 ¡ ², g1(s¤; n) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s¤ ¡ »n, and g1(s; n) =
max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s for s 6= s0; s¤. We take » small enough so that max¯2xn ¯ ¢ s = g1(s; n)
for every s and n. Again, this is possible since S is ¯nite. By construction, xn ! x.
Compare xn and x
0. In the ¯rst hierarchy, the di®erence between the valuations
from xn and x
0 isX
s2S
¹1(s)max
¯2xn
¯ ¢ s¡
X
s2S
¹1(s)max
¯2x0
¯ ¢ s = ¡¹1(s¤)»n > 0:
Hence, xn Â x0 for every n.
Next, compare x0 and x. Since s0 =2 supp(¹1), x0 is indi®erent to x in the ¯rst
hierarchy. In the second hierarchy, the di®erence between the valuations from x and
x0 is X
s2S
¹2(s)max
¯2x0
¯ ¢ s¡
X
s2S
¹2(s)max
¯2x
¯ ¢ s = ¹2(s0)² > 0:
Therefore, x0 Â x.
For ¹1(s
¤) > 0, we modify fxng. De¯ne
xn = \s2[2j=1supp(¹j)f¯ 2 ¢(B)j ¯ ¢ s · g2(s; n)g;
where g2(s
0; n) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s0 ¡ ², g2(s¤; n) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s¤ + »n, and g2(s; n) =
max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s for s 6= s0; s¤. Then the same argument holds.
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Subcase 1-2: ¹2(s
0) < 0. With the following modi¯cation, we can make the
same argument as in Subcase 1-1. Let
x = \s2[2j=1supp(¹j)f¯ 2 ¢(B)j ¯ ¢ s · f2(s)g;
where f2(s
0) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s0 + ², and f2(s) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s for s 6= s0. If ¹1(s¤) > 0,
de¯ne
xn = \s2[2j=1supp(¹j)f¯ 2 ¢(B)j ¯ ¢ s · g3(s; n)g;
where g3(s
0; n) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s0 + ², g3(s¤; n) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s¤ + »n, and g3(s; n) =
max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s for s 6= s0; s¤. If ¹1(s¤) < 0, de¯ne
xn = \s2[2j=1supp(¹j)f¯ 2 ¢(B)j ¯ ¢ s · g4(s; n)g;
where g4(s
0; n) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s0 + ², g4(s¤; n) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s¤ ¡ »n, and g4(s; n) =
max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s for s 6= s0; s¤.
Case 2: supp(¹1) = [2j=1supp(¹j). First, note that supp(¹1) has to contain more
than two states since we consider a lexicographic representation of minimal length.
Moreover, there exit two states s0 and s00 such that ¹2(s
0)
¹1(s0)
6= ¹2(s00)
¹1(s00)
.
Subcase 2-1: ¹1(s) < 0 for s = s
0; s00. Label s0; s00 as ¹2(s
0)
¹1(s0)
< ¹2(s
00)
¹1(s00)
. Let ² > 0.
De¯ne
x = \s2supp(¹1)f¯ 2 ¢(B)j ¯ ¢ s · f3(s)g;
where f3(s
0) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s0 ¡ ², f3(s00) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s00 + ¹1(s0)¹1(s00)², and f3(s) =
max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s for s 6= s0; s00. We take ² small enough so that x is a menu with
max¯2x ¯ ¢ s = f3(s) for every s 2 S. This is possible since S is ¯nite.
Let » 2 (0; 1). De¯ne
xn = \s2supp(¹1)f¯ 2 ¢(B)j ¯ ¢ s · g5(s; n)g;
where g5(s
0; n) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s0 ¡ ² ¡ »n, g5(s00; n) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s00 + ¹1(s0)¹1(s00)², and
g5(s; n) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s for s 6= s0; s00. We take » small enough so that max¯2xn ¯ ¢ s =
g5(s; n) for every s and n. Again, this is possible since S is ¯nite. By construction,
xn ! x.
Compare xn and x
0. In the ¯rst hierarchy, the di®erence between the valuations
from xn and x
0 isX
s2S
¹1(s)max
¯2xn
¯ ¢ s¡
X
s2S
¹1(s)max
¯2x0
¯ ¢ s = ¡¹1(s0)»n > 0:
Hence, xn Â x0 for all n.
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Next, compare x0 and x. In the ¯rst hierarchy, x is indi®erent to x0 becauseX
s2S
¹1(s)max
¯2x0
¯ ¢ s¡
X
s2S
¹1(s)max
¯2x
¯ ¢ s = ¹1(s0)²¡ ¹1(s00) ¹1(s
0)
¹1(s00)
² = 0:
The di®erence between the valuations from x0 and x in the second hierarchy isX
s2S
¹2(s)max
¯2x0
¯ ¢ s¡
X
s2S
¹2(s)max
¯2x
¯ ¢ s
=¹2(s
0)max
¯2y
¯ ¢ s0 + ¹2(s00)max
¯2y
¯ ¢ s00
¡ ¹2(s0)
µ
max
¯2y
¯ ¢ s0 ¡ ²
¶
¡ ¹2(s00)
µ
max
¯2y
¯ ¢ s00 + ¹1(s
0)
¹1(s00)
²
¶
=
¹2(s
0)¹1(s00)¡ ¹2(s00)¹1(s0)
¹1(s00)
² > 0:
Therefore, x0 Â x.
With the following constructions of x and fxng, the same argument holds for the
other cases.
Subcase 2-2: ¹1(s) > 0 for s = s
0; s00. Label s0; s00 as ¹2(s
0)
¹1(s0)
< ¹2(s
00)
¹1(s00)
. De¯ne
x = \s2supp(¹1)f¯ 2 ¢(B)j ¯ ¢ s · f4(s)g;
where f4(s
0) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s + ², f4(s00) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s00 ¡ ¹1(s0)¹1(s00)², and f4(s) =
max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s for s 6= s0; s00. De¯ne
xn = \s2supp(¹1)f¯ 2 ¢(B)j ¯ ¢ s · g6(s; n)g;
where g6(s
0; n) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s0 + ² + »n, g6(s00; n) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s00 ¡ ¹1(s0)¹1(s00)², and
g6(s; n) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s for s 6= s0; s00.
Subcase 2-3: ¹1(s
0) < 0 and ¹1(s00) > 0. If
¹2(s0)
¹1(s0)
< ¹2(s
00)
¹1(s00)
, the constructions of
x and fxng are the same as Subcase 2-1.
If ¹2(s
0)
¹1(s0)
> ¹2(s
00)
¹1(s00)
, we de¯ne
x = \s2supp(¹1)f¯ 2 ¢(B)j ¯ ¢ s · f5(s)g;
where f5(s
0) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s0 + ², f5(s00) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s00 ¡ ¹1(s0)¹1(s00)², and f5(s) =
max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s for s 6= s0; s00. De¯ne
xn = \s2supp(¹1)f¯ 2 ¢(B)j ¯ ¢ s · g7(s; n)g;
where g7(s
0; n) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s0 + ² ¡ »n, g7(s00; n) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s00 ¡ ¹1(s0)¹1(s00)², and
g7(s; n) = max¯02y ¯0 ¢ s for s 6= s0; s00.
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D Proof of Corollary 4.4
The necessity is straightforward. We show only the su±ciency.
To begin with, note that Monotonicity implies that ¹1 is a positive measure.
Let (S; U; f¹jgKj=1) be a canonical lexicographic representation of % such that ¹j
is a positive measure for j = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; k (5 K ¡ 1). It is enough to show that there
is a canonical lexicographic representation (S; U; f¹0jgKj=1) of % such that ¹0j = ¹j for
j = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; k and ¹0k+1 is a positive measure.
First, we see that if s 2 supp(¹k+1) n [kj=1supp(¹j), then ¹k+1(s) > 0. Suppose to
the contrary that ¹k+1(s) < 0. Fix a sphere y ½int¢(B). De¯ne
x = \s02[k+1j=1 supp(¹j)nfsgf¯ 2 ¢(B)j ¯ ¢ s
0 5 max
¯02y
¯0 ¢ s0g:
Then the representation implies that y Â x while y ½ x, contradicting Monotonicity.
Next, we construct the desired f¹0jgKj=1. Let ² > 0 be such that
minf¹j(s)jj = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; k; and s 2 [kj=1supp(¹j)g > ²max
s
j¹k+1(s)j :
De¯ne f¹0jgKj=1 by
¹0j = ¹j for j 6= k + 1;
¹0k+1 =
kX
j=1
¹j + ²¹k+1:
Then it follows from Part (ii) of Lemma 2 that (S; U; f¹0jg) represents the same order
as (S; U; f¹jg). By construction, ¹0j is a positive measure for j = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; k + 1. This
completes the proof.
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